Logic Programming in a Fragment of Intuitionistic Linear Logic: Extended Abstract by Hodas, Joshua S & Miller, Dale
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Technical Reports (CIS) Department of Computer & Information Science 
April 1991 
Logic Programming in a Fragment of Intuitionistic Linear Logic: 
Extended Abstract 
Joshua S. Hodas 
University of Pennsylvania 
Dale Miller 
University of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports 
Recommended Citation 
Joshua S. Hodas and Dale Miller, "Logic Programming in a Fragment of Intuitionistic Linear Logic: 
Extended Abstract", . April 1991. 
University of Pennsylvania Department of Computer and Information Science Technical Report No. MS-CIS-91-32. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports/371 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Logic Programming in a Fragment of Intuitionistic Linear Logic: Extended 
Abstract 
Abstract 
Logic programming languages based on fragments of intuitionistic logic have recently been developed 
and studied by several researchers. In such languages, implications are permitted in goals and in the 
bodies of clauses. Attempting to prove a goal of the form D ⊃ G in a context τ leads to an attempt to 
prove the goal G in the extended context τ ∪{D}. While an intuitionistic notion of context has many uses, it 
has turned out to be either too powerful or too limiting in several settings. We refine the intuitionistic 
notion of context by using a fragment of Girard's linear logic that includes additive and multiplicative 
conjunction, linear implication, universal quantification, the "of course" exponential, and the constants 1 
(the empty context) and T (for "erasing" contexts). After presenting our fragment of linear logic, which 
contains the hereditary Harrop formulas, we show that the logic has a goal-directed interpretation. We 
also show that the non-determinism that results from the need to split contexts in order to prove a 
multiplicative conjunction can be handled by viewing proof search as a process that takes a context, 
consumes part of it, and returns the rest (to be consumed elsewhere). The complete specification of an 
interpreter for this logic is presented. Examples taken from theorem proving, natural language parsing, 
and data base programming are presented: each example requires a linear, rather than intuitionistic, 
notion of context to be modeled adequately. 
Comments 
University of Pennsylvania Department of Computer and Information Science Technical Report No. MS-
CIS-91-32. 
This technical report is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports/371 
Logic Programming In A 
Fragment Of Intuitionist ic Linear Logic: 
Extended Abstract 
MS-CIS-91-32 
LOGIC & COMPUTATION 32 
Joshua S. Hodas 
Dale Miller 
Department of Computer and Information Science 
School of Engineering and Applied Science 
University of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6389 
April 1991 
Logic Programming in a 
Fragment of Intuitionist ic Linear Logic: 
Extended Abstract* 
Joshua S. Hodas 
Computer Science Dept . 
University of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6389 USA 
hodas0saul.cis.upenn.edu 
Dale Miller 
LFCS, Computer Science Dept. 
University of Edinburgh, KB 
Edinburgh EH9 3JZ Scotland 
dmi0lfcs.ed.ac.uk 
Abstract 1 Iiltroduction 
Logic programming languages based on fragments of 
intuitionistic logic have recently been developed and 
studied by several researchers. In  such languages, int- 
plications are permitted in  goals and in  the bodies of 
clauses. Attempting to prove a goal of the form D > G 
in  a context I' leads to  an attempt to prove the goal G 
in  the extended context I' U { D ) .  While an intuition- 
istic notion of context has many uses, it has turn.ed 
out t o  be either too powerful or too limiting i n  several 
settings. W e  refine the intuitionistic notion of context 
by using a fragment of Girard's linear logic that in- 
cludes additive and multiplicative con3unction, linear 
implication, universal quantification, the "of course" 
exponential, and the constants 1 (the empty context) 
and T (for "erasing" contexts). After presenting our 
fragment of linear logic, we show that the logic h,as 
a goal-directed interpretation. W e  also show that the 
non-determinism that results from the need to split 
contexts in order to  prove a multiplicative con~unctioiz 
can be handled by viewing proof search as a process 
that takes a context, consumes part of it, and returns 
the rest (to be consumed elsewhere). Examples taken 
from theorem proving, natural language parsing, and 
data base programming are presented: each example 
requires a linear, rather than intuitionistic, notion of 
context t o  be modeled adequately. 
Fragments of intuitionistic first-order and higher-order 
logics have been used for several years as specification 
languages and logic programming languages. For ex- 
ample, first-order and higher-order versions of heredi- 
tary Harrop formulas (formulas with no positive oc- 
currences of disjunctions or existentials) have been 
used as both specification languages for proof systems 
[7,8,25,29] and as the basis of logic programming lan- 
guages [9, 12, 18, 20, 211. Much of the expressivity of 
such systems derives from the the intuitionistic proof 
rule which states that t o  prove an implicational goal 
of the form D > G in the presence of a proof context 
I', the context is augmented with D and a proof of G 
is attempted in the new context. That  is, the sequent 
I ' - D ~ G h a s a p r o o f i f a n d o n l y i f I ' U { D ) - G  
has a proof. 
The presence of changing antecedents (contexts) 
within intuitionistic sequent proofs can be exploited 
in many ways. In theorem provers, it can be used to 
store the current assumptions and eigen-variables of a 
proof; in natural language parsers, it can be used to  
store assumed gaps when parsing relative clauses; in 
database programs, it can be used to  store the state 
of the data base; in logic programs, it can be used to  
provide a basis for modular programming, local dec- 
larations, and abstract data types. 
While intuitionistic contexts naturally address com- 
puting concerns in a large number of applications, in 
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times. Thus, the freely available contraction rule for 
intuitionistic contexts means that contexts can always 
be assumed to grow as the proof is developed from 
the bottom up. Such monotonicity is problematic in 
numerous settings. 
When using an intuitionistic meta-logic to design 
theorem provers it is natural to  use the meta- 
logic's context to  manage object-level hypothe- 
ses and eigen-variables [8, 141. With such an ap- 
proach, however, it is not possible to specify any 
variations to the contraction rule: arbitrary con- 
traction on all hypotheses is imposed by the mneta- 
logic. 
A proposed technique for parsing relative clauses 
is t o  first assume the existence of a noun phrase 
(a  gap)  and then attempt to  parse a senteilce [24]. 
Intuitionistic contexts do not naturally enforce 
the constraint that the assumed gap must be used 
while parsing the relative clause and that the gap 
cannot appear in certain positions ("island con- 
straints" 1271). 
Intuitionistic contexts can be used to manage a 
data base. While adding facts, querying facts, 
and performing hypothetical reasoning ("if I pass 
CS121 will I graduate") are easy to model us- 
ing intuitionistic contexts, updating and retract- 
ing facts are not straightforward [3, 9, 191. 
A notion of state encapsulation can be approxi- 
mated using intuitionistic logic [15]. An object's 
state can be represented by assumptions in a con- 
text. Updating that state, however, means chailg- 
ing those assumptions. The only change allowed 
with intuitionistic contexts is that of augment- 
ing the state's representative assumptions. Thus, 
an object's state becomes progressively more non- 
deterministic: seldom the correct notion of state. 
Each of these problems can, however, be addressed by 
adopting a more refined notion of context. In this es- 
tended abstract, we exa.mine a fragment of linear logic 
that makes a suitable logic programming language and 
permits very natural forinulatioils that a.ddress a.ll of 
the above problems. 
2 Language Design Issues 
Consider a first-order logic based on the logical con- 
stants @ (tensor), & (additive conjunction), -0 (linear 
implication), ! (of-course), V, 1, T. Our presentation 
of sequent proof systems for this logic will differ from 
the usual one [I, 101 in some simple ways. First, the 
antecedent (left-hand side) of a sequent arrow will al- 
ways contain a single formula: the comma tradition- 
ally used in the antecedent of a sequent will be for- 
mally identified with the connective @, and an empty 
antecedent with the formula 1. Thus no introduction 
rule for @ on the left is needed. Second, antecedents 
(contexts) are identified if they can be shown to  be 
equal via the equations for associativity, commutativ- 
ity, identity, and the idempotency of !'ed formulas. 
That is, two contexts are considered equal for the pur- 
poses of building sequent proofs if one arises from the 
other by applying the following equations to subfor- 
mulas that are either top-level or in the scope of @'s 
only: 
By employing this notion of equality on contexts, the 
structural rules of interchange, contraction for !'ed for- 
mulas, and thinning for the formula 1 (the empty con- 
test) are used implicitly. If s is a subformula o f t  that 
occurs in t in the scope of only 8 ' s  and is neither a 
top-level @I nor equal to 1, then s is a componen t  o f t .  
If the outermost connective in t is not a @, then t has 
only one component. 
A cut-free, sequent style proof system C for this frag- 
ment of linear logic is given in Figure 1. The syntactic 
variables r ,  B ,  C denote formulas. The syntactic vari- 
able ! r  denotes a thinable formula, that is, a formula 
all of whose components are either 1 or !B (for some 
B). The standard eigen-variable condition is assumed 
for the VR rule. A proof rule that says that if r and 
I" are equal contexts and if r - C has a proof then 
I?' - C has a, proof is assumed to be used whenever 
it is needed. 
Proposi t ion 1 Let B be a f irst-order formula  o v e r  
the  logical constants  @, &, 4, !,V, 1, T. T h e  sequent 
1 - B i s  provable i n  C i f a n d  on ly  i f  B i s  provable i n  
l inear  logic. For t h i s  sublogic, provabili ty i n  classical 
and i a f u i f i o n i s t i c  l inear  logic coincide [30]. 
Two formulas B and C are equivalent,  written B C, 
if the sequents B + C and C - B are provable in 
C. We note the following equivalences: 
1 E!T, !(B & C )  =!B@!C, 
B - o ( C & D ) _ ( B - o C ) & ( B - o D ) ,  
B 4 (Vx.C) G Vx(B -0 C )  (provided x not free in B )  
Vx(B & C) = (V2.B) & (Vx.C) 
identity - 1R - ! r  - 1 r -T T R  ! r @ B - B  
r - B  A - C  
r @ A - B @ C  @ R  
Figure 1: C: A Proof System for a Fragment of Li11ea.r 
Logic 
Given the first equivalence, the constant 1 could be 
eliminated from our consideration, although there 
seems to be no good reason to do so. 
It is possible to strengthen C proofs a bit further, by 
observing that the multiplicative inference rules, - o L  
and @R,  can be assumed to behave additavely with re- 
spect of !'ed formulas. That is, we can assume that,  for 
both of these inference rules, if the antecedent of the 
conclusion has the component !B, then !B is a com- 
ponent of the antecedent of both premises. A proof 
where this additional restriction on 4 L  and @R holds 
will be called a ! -addi t ive  proof. Thus, a !-additive 
proof of the sequent !B @ r - C is such that the an- 
tecedent of all sequents in the proof contain a top-level 
occurrence of !B. 
P r o p o s i t i o ~ i  2 T h e  seq ,uenl  1 - B h a s  a !-addil iae 
L proof  i f  a n d  o n l y  i f  B i s  provable  Z I I  l i n e a r  logic.  
The logic considered so far does not yield a satisfac- 
tory logic programming language because it cannot 
be interpreted in a completely goal-directed fashion. 
Following [19, 211, we formalize the notion of goal- 
directed provability by the simple notion of a u n i f o n ~ z  
proof:  a cut-free, sequent proof is uniform if when- 
ever a sequent in the proof has a non-atomic succe- 
dent (right-hand side), that sequent is the conclusion 
of a right introduction rule. A logical system is an 
( a b s t r a c t )  logac p r o g r a m m i n g  l a n g u a g e  if restricting to 
uniform proofs preserves completeness. Thus, if a se- 
quent - B is provable in a logic programming 
language, it is always possible to find a proof by first 
concentrating only on the succedent of the sequent, 
breaking down its logical structure and reflecting it 
into the proof. Left introduction rules only need to be 
considered when atomic succedents are encountered. 
Restricting provability in C to  uniform proofs does not 
maintain completeness, however. For example, the se- 
quen t~  !a & b -!a and b @ (b-o!a) -!a are provable 
in L but do not have uniform proofs. Given this ob- 
servation there seem to be two approaches to  take: re- 
strict the language so that a !'ed formula, for example, 
never appears in a succedent, or restrict formulas that 
occur in contexts so that the above counterexamples 
(and their kin) do not appear. The first approach has 
been taken in the recent paper [13]. We shall take the 
second approach, however, for three reasons. First, 
some of the examples mentioned in Section 1 are most 
successfully explained using ! in succedents. Second, 
it can be seen that if the intuitionistic connectives of 
hereditary Harrop formulas are mapped into formulas 
using linear connectives [lo], occurrences of ! never 
appear immediately under & or as the conclusion of 
4 .  Maintaining such a restriction rules out the above 
two examples sequents and would seem a sensible ap- 
proach since the logic here is a refinement of heredi- 
tary Harrop formulas. Third, it will be useful for an 
interpreter to be able to examine a component of its 
context and to determine immediately whether it is a 
"use once" formula or a "use any number" formula. 
If ! were permitted as a strictly positive subformula 
occurrence of a & or a -0, it would not be possible 
to make this distinction immediately. In the first ex- 
ample, there is a non-deterministic choice to be made 
before this distinction can be made with the formula 
!a & b ,  and in the second a subproof needs to be per- 
formed (to prove b) before it can be seen that the 
formula b - a ! a  yields a !'ed formula. Our restrictions 
on the logic will be those that exclude these kinds of 
forniulas in contexts. 
Below is the definition of three classes of formulas: R 
for resource formulas, D for definite formulas (pro- 
gram formulas), and G for goal formulas (queries). 
It is possible t o  show that if C proofs are rest,ricted to  
proofs of sequents of the form D - G then uniform 
proofs are complete. The restricted logic is, therefore, 
an abstract logic programming language. This result 
can be strengthened by first making the following def- 
initions. 
Let R be a closed resource formula. Let IRI be the 
smallest set of pairs (G, R'), where G is a multiset of 
goal formulas and Rt is a resource formula, such that 
2. if (G, Ri  & Rg) E IR1 then both (6, R1) E IRI and 
(G, R2) E IRI 
3. if ((;,Vx.Ri) E JRI then for all closed terms t ,  
(G, Rt[tlxl) E IRI 
4. if (G,G -o Rt) E (RI then (G U {G), R') E IRI 
(here, 6 U {G) is multiset union) 
Informally, if (G, A) E (RI then the formula R can 
be used to establish the atomic formula A if each of 
the goal formulas in G can be established; that is, A 
might be proved by backchaining over R. Let C' be the 
proof system that results from replacing the identity, 
-oL, &L, and VL rules in Figure 1 with the backchain- 
ing inference rule in Figure 2. Thus, there are only 
two left rules in C', namely, backchaining and !L. The 
notion of !-additive proofs is easily extended to L'. 
The following proposition helps t o  justify our claim 
that our restriction to linear formulas yields a logic 
programming language. 
Propos i t ion  3 Let G be a goal formula. The sequent 
1 - G h a s  a !-additive, u n i f o r m  proof i n  C' if a ~ t d  
on ly  if G i s  provable in l inear  logic. 
This proposition can be proved by showing that any 
proof in C can be transformed directly into a uniform 
proof in Ct by a series of permutations of inference 
rules. Similar permutation arguments can be found in 
[19, 211. 
Since the formulas allowed in antecedents are different 
from those allowed in succedents, a cut rule cannot 
be stated for this logic programming language. The 
collection of formulas in the intersection between D- 
and G-formulas is, however, non-empty and can be 
described using the following two classes of formulas: 
Figure 2: Backchaining: provided n 2 0, A is atomic, 
and ({GI,. . . , G,), A) E IRI. 
The collection of M formulas is precisely those for- 
mulas which are both goals and definite formulas. A 
cut-elimination theorem can be stated and proved for 
a restriction t o  M formulas only. Modulo the equiva- 
lences 1 4 s ~  S a n d  ( M 1 @ M 2 ) - o S ~  M1-oM2-oS, 
the ~ollect~ion S can also be described as simply that 
collection of formulas freely generated from &, V, and 
both linear and intuitionistic implications: that is, S 
can be defined by 
It is worth noting some simple variants of the defini- 
tions of R,  D ,  and G formulas. First, it is an easy 
matter t o  add the existential quantifier and the ad- 
ditive disjunction @ to  goal formulas: all the results 
below generalize easily to  this case. (It is not possible 
to add existential quantifiers or @ to  either resource 
formulas or definite formulas without seriously losing 
the completeness of uniform proofs.) Second, given 
the equivalences mentioned above, it is possible to re- 
place the definition for resources with 
Such a simplification makes the presentation of 
ba.ckchaining a bit simplier, a fact used in the next 
section. 
A final comment: If the uniformity conditions are ap- 
plied directly to  proofs in Girard's original formulation 
of intuitionistic linear logic [lo] then completeness is 
lost quickly, even for the restricted language described 
above. For example, the sequents a @ 6 - 6 @ a and 
!a -!a@!a have proofs but not uniform proofs. In 
the first case, an @L rule is required t o  convert the 
antecedent to a ,  b and in the second case, a contrac- 
t,ion is needed to form the antecedent !a,!a (reading 
proofs bottom-up). Since these left rules must be done 
before any right rule, these sequents do not have uni- 
form proofs. In this setting, however, such a failure is 
easy to  circumvent: in both cases, the contexts a @ b 
and a ,  b,  and !a and !a, !a, do not seem different in any 
significant computational sense. Formally identifying 
them as is done in C and L' produces proof systems in subtensor(1,O) I{G)I  
which uniform proofs cover a greater number of ca.ses. I { l ) I  I{T)O I {!G) I 
3 An Input/Output Model of Re- 
source Consumption 
The information in Proposition 3 is enough to form 
the basis of the design of a prototype interpreter for 
this restriction of linear logic. Such an interpreter 
will not, however, receive any guidance when it needs 
to  break up an antecedent in order to apply the @ R  
or backchaining rules in a bottom-up fashion. Given 
that proofs can be assumed to be !-additive, a theo- 
rem prover only needs to  decide how to break up the 
non-!'ed formulas in the context. Nevertheless, trying 
all possible partitions of those formulas is, of course, 
exponential in the number of such formulas. Clearly, 
a better strategy is desirable. 
Given our restriction on what kinds of formulas can 
appear in contexts (namely definite formulas), it is 
possible t o  view the process of proof building as one 
where resource formulas get used and, if they are not, 
!led, deleted. Thus, one way to attempt a proof of 
G1 8 G2 from a D-formula D is to  first try to prove 
GI ,  deleting non-!'ed R-formulas as they are used in 
backchaining. If the search for a proof of G1 is suc- 
cessful, the resulting context, say D', is then used t o  
prove the second goal G2. If the correct amount of re- 
sources are left to  prove G2 ,  then the compound goal 
G1 @ G2 will have been proved without splitting the 
context artificially. 
With this motivation, we can define the predicate 
I{G)O, where I and 0 are D-formuhe, to  mean in- 
formally that when given input I, a proof for G can be 
found that returns the resources in 0 .  To malie t~llis in- 
formal notion precise, we need the following definitions 
regarding definite formulas. Notice that coinpollents 
of a definite formula D are either 1 or of the form R or 
!R. The ternary relation pickR(I,O, R) holds if R is a 
component of I and 0 results from replacing that oc- 
currence of R in I with 1 (this achieves deletion). The 
relation also holds if !R is a component of I, a.nd I and 
0 are equal (!'ed formulas are not deleted). A definite 
formula 0 is a sub tensor  of I, denoted by the predi- 
cate subtensor(1,O) if 0 arises from replacing zero or 
more non-!'ed components of I with 1. The formula. I 
is th inable ,  written thinable(I), if all of its colnponents 
are either 1 or !'ed formulas. 
Figure 3 provides a specification of the predicate 
I{G)O for the propositional fragment of this logic in 
which the simpler definition of resource formulas (see 
(*) above) is used (no equations are needed to char- 
Figure 3: Specification of an interpreter for the propo- 
sitional language 
acterize contexts in this specification). A fuller spec- 
ification of I{G)O and the other predicates is given 
using Prolog in Figure 4. In that presentation, I{G)O 
is written using the syntax prove(1 ,O , G ) ,  @ is writ- 
ten as x, -o as - 0 ,  T as t r u e ,  and !G as bang((;). 
(Infix declarations for x, -0, and & are missing from 
Figure 4, as are Horn clauses defining the atomic for- 
mulas of the object-logic via the i s A  predicate.) The 
Prolog code only implements the propositional part of 
this logic since Prolog has no natural representation of 
object-level quantification. If XProlog [22] is used for 
this specification, such quantifiers can be implemented 
directly using A-abstractions. The resulting specifica- 
tion in XProlog would be identical to that given in 
Figure 4 except that two more Horn clauses - one for 
proving a universal quantifier and one for backchain- 
ing over a universal quantifier - would need t o  be 
a.dded. 
I11 order t o  state the correctness of these specifications 
of I{G)O, we need the notion of the difference, I - 
0, of two definite formulas, whenever it is the case 
that subtensor(1,O). This is defined by the following 
equations: 
I-Iere, of course, R denotes a resource formula. 
Propos i t ion  4 Let I and 0 be contexts  (definite for- 
mulas )  and let  G be a goal formula.  T h e  proposition 
I{G)O i s  provable i f  and  on ly  if ( I  - 0 )  -0 G i s  prov- 
able i n  l inear  logic. 
Thus, a complete procedure for proving queries from 
Horn clauses can be used to prove sequents of the form 
D - G in linear logic. A depth-first search proce- 
dure for Horn clauses can also provide a depth-first 
search procedure for linear logic. Consider the be- 
haviour of a Prolog interpreter attempting to prove 
I{G1 @ Gz)O. First the interpreter tries to prove 
I{G1)M, for some definite formula M .  If this suc- 
ceeds, then M{G2)0  is attempted. If this second 
attempt fails, the interpreter retries I{G1)M look- 
ing for some different pattern of consumption to find 
a new value for M. If such a value is found, then 
M { G 2 ) 0  is re-attempted. Similarly, in attempting to  
prove I{D 4 G)O, the interpreter will first attempt 
to prove D @ I{G)B @ 0 and then check that B is 
a thinable context. If this is not the case, the11 the 
interpreter must retry D @ I{G)B @ 0 looking for a 
new value for B. 
Proposition 5 T h e  goal formula G is provable in 1i11.- prove('sl* 
ear  logic if and only if t he  proposition 1{G)1 is prov- prove(I.0, true) :- subtensor(1, 0) 
prove(I.0, GI & G2) :- prove(I,O,GI), 
able. prove (I, 0, G2) . 
prove(I,O, D -0 G) :- prove(D x I,B x O,G), As the process of constructing a proof of 1{G)1 pro- 
thinable (B) . 
ceeds, a Horn clause interpreter would generate goals prove (1 ,o, ~ 2 )  : - prove(1 ,M,G~) , 
of the form t rove (M, 0 ,G2) . 
where T I , .  . . ,Tn, S1, .  . . , Sn are definite formulas and 
n > 0 is the number of -R rules encouiltered on the 
path from the root. Thus, contexts act as stacks, and 
corresponding elements, say T, and Si, are related by 
the subtensor relation. 
It is worth noting that,  in this setting, proviilg the 
goal !G from a D-formula is equivalent to  proving tmhe 
goal 1 & G from that same D-formula. 
4 Context Management in Theorelll 
Provers 
Intuitionistic logic is a useful meta-logic for the spec- 
ification of provability of various object.-logics. For 
example, consider axiomatizing provability in propo- 
sitional, intuitionistic logic (over the logical symbols 
imp, and, o r ,  and false for object-level implica.t.ion, 
conjunction, disjunction, and absurdity). A very nat- 
ural axiomization of implication introduction is (ig- 
noring the actual construction of proofs) 
pv(A imp B) :- hyp(A) => pv(B). 
prove(I,I, bang((;)) :- prove(I,I,~). 
prove (I, 0, A) :- isA(A), pickR(I,H,R), 
backchain(M,O ,A,R) . 
backchain(I,I,A, A). 
backchain(1 ,O,A, G -0 R) :- backchain(I,M,A,R) , 
prove(M,O,G). 
backchain(I,O.A, R1 & R2) :- backchain(I,O,A,Rl); 
backchain(I,O,A,R2). 
thinable (1) . 
thinable (bang(T) 1. 
thinable (T x S) :- thinable(T) , thinableGI . 
where pv and hyp are the meta-level predicates denot- 
ing provability and hypothesis. Here => denotes meta- Figure 4: A Prolog implementation of the interpreter 
level implies and :- denotes its converse. We also 
pv(A and B) o- pv(B) & pv(A). 
pv(A imp B) o- hyp(A) -0 pv(B). 
pv(A or B) o- pv(A). 
pv(A or B) o- pv(B). 
pv(G) o- hyp(A and B) x 
(hyp(A) x hyp(B) -0 pv(G)). 
pv(G) o- hyp(A or B) x ((hyp(A) -0 pv(G) k 
(hyp(B) -0 pv(G))) .  
pv(G) o- hyp(C imp B) x 
(hyp(C imp B) -0 pv(C)) & 
(hyp(B) -0 pv(G)). 
pv(G) o- hyp(f a l s e )  x true .  
pv(G) o- hyp(G) x true .  
Figure 5: A Specification of An Intuitionistic Propo- 
sitional Object-Logic 
adopt the convention that any capital letters in a for- 
mula that are not explicitly quantified a.re assuined to 
be universally quantified at the outermost scope of the 
displayed formula. Operationally, this formula states 
that one way to  prove A imp B is to  add hyp(A) to  the 
context and attempt a proof of pv (B) . In the same set- 
ting, conjunction elimination can be expressed by the 
formula 
(where a comma denotes a meta-level coi~junction). 
pv(G) o- hyp((C imp D) imp B) x 
((hyp(D imp B) -0 pv(C imp D)) k 
(hyp(B) -0 pv(G) 1). 
pv(G) o- hyp((C and D) imp B) x 
(hyp(C imp (D imp B) -0 pv(G)). 
pv(G) o- hyp((C or D) imp B) x 
(hyp(C imp B) -0 hyp(D imp B) -0 pv(G)) . 
pv(G) o- hyp(fa1se imp B) x pv(G). 
pv(G) o- hyp(A imp B) x isatom(A) x 
hyp(A) x (hyp(B) x hyp(A) -0 pv(G)). 
Figure 6: A Contraction-Free Formulation of > L 
implication elimination and not for any other logical 
connectives. If we replace the intuitionistic meta-logic 
with our refinement using linear logic, however, these 
~bservat~ions about contraction in intuitionistic logic 
can be stated. Figure 5 is such a specification. Here, 
and in the rest of the code segments in the paper, 
o- denotes the converse of -0.  Formulas carry the 
same implicit quantifier assumption mentioned above. 
In a.ddition, each quantified formula is assumed to be 
!'ed at the outermost level. Finally, the individual for- 
mulas are tied together with 8 ' s  t o  form a single D 
formula for the proof context. 
Operationally, this formula states that in order to  In the modified specification, a hypothesis is both prove some formula G I  first check to see if there is 
"read from" and "written into" the context during the 
a conjunction, say A and B, in the contest and, if so, 
elimination of implications. All other elimination rules 
attempt a proof of G in which the context is extended 
sinlply "read from" the context; they do not "write 
with the two hypotheses A and B. Other introduction back." The last two formulas in Figure 5 use a 8 with 
and elimination rules can be axiomatized similarly. Fi- T: this allows for all unused hypotheses t o  be erased. 
nally, the formula 
is needed t o  actually complete a proof. With the com- 
plete specification, it is easy to  prove that there is a 
proof in the meta-logic (the logic programming world) 
if and only if there is a proof in the object-logic. 
This method of specifying provability does not extend 
naturally to  logics that have restricted contraction 
rules, such as linear logic itself, because hypotheses are 
maintained in intuitionistic logic contexts and hence 
can be used zero or more times. Similarly, it is not 
possible to logically express the fact that in intuition- 
istic propositional logic, contraction is needed only for 
It should be noted that this specification cannot be 
used effectively with a depth-first interpreter because 
if the inlplication left rule can be used once, it can 
be used any number of times, thereby causing the 
interpreter to loop. Fortunately for this example, 
a contraction-free presentation of propositional intu- 
itionistic logic is given in [6]. That  presentation can 
be expressed directly in this setting by replacing the 
one formula specifying implication elimination in Fig- 
ure 5 with the (partial) axiomatization of object-level 
atomic formulas and the five special cases of implica- 
tion elimination in Figure 6. Executing this linear 
logic program in depth-first mode yields a decision 
procedure for propositional intuitionistic logic. 
5 The Modality of !'ed Formulas 
One extension to  logic programming languages that 
has been studied for several years is the demo- 
predicate [4]. The intended meaning of attempting 
a query of the form demo(D, G) in context (program) 
I' is simply attempting the query G in the context con- 
taining only D; that is, the main context is forgotten 
during the scope of the demo-predicate. A use of a 
!'ed goal has a related meaning. Consider proving the 
sequent !R1 8 R2 -!GI 8 G2. Given our analysis of 
proofs in Section 2, this is provable if and only if the 
two sequents !R1 + G1 and !R1 8 Rz --+ G2 are 
provable. In other words, the use of the "of course" 
operator forces GI to be proved in a context that con- 
tains only !'ed formulas. In a sense, since non-!led re- 
sources can come and go within contexts, they can be 
viewed as "contingent" resources; an of-course opera- 
tor on a resource in a context means that it will always 
be present in the context; that is, it is a "necessary" 
resource. The of-course operator attached to a goal en- 
sures that the provability of the goal only depends on 
the necessary and not the contingent resources of t,he 
context. Thus, with respect to  contiilgeilt resources, 
the goal !(D * G) behaves similarly to demo(D, G).  
We present two simple examples where this modality 
of !'ed formulas is illustrated. The first is a simple 
data base query program displayed in Figure 7. To 
make this example interesting, we have augmented the 
language with the read, write, and nl (new line) in- 
put/output commands. Figure 8 presents a session us- 
ing this program. This example also shows some possi- 
ble limitations of linear contexts in this data base set- 
ting. For example, it does not seem possible to query 
a context to find out if an entry is contingent and 
not necessary (although accommodating negation-as- 
failure would make this possible). Also, a coininand 
to retract a necessary (committed) entry call be exe- 
cuted without any problem (see Figure 8), but it does 
not have the effect of actually deleting the entry. 
db o- write('Command: ') x read(Command) x 
do (Command) . 
db o- write('Try again.') x nl x db. 
do (enter(Entry1) o- entry (Entry) -0 db. 
do (commit (Entry)) o- bang(entry(Entry)) -0 db. 
do(retract(Entry)) o- entry(Entry1 x db. 
do (upd(Old, New)) o- entry (Old) x 
(entry(New) -0 db). 
do(check(Q)) o- (entry(9) x true x write(@ x 
write(' is an entry.') x nl) & db. 
do(necessary (4)) o- 
(bang(entry (9)) x true x vrite(Q) x 
write(' is a necessary entry') x nl) & db. 
do(quit) o- true. 
Figure 7: A Simple Data Base Query Program 
Command: enter(enroll(jane,csl)). 
Command: check(enroll(jane,X) . 
enroll(jane, csi) is an entry. 
Command: upd(enroll(jane,csl), 
enroll (j ane , cs2) ) . 
Command: check(enroll(jane,X)). 
enroll(jane ,cs2) is an entry. 
Command: commit (student (jane)) . 
Command: enter(student(b0b)). 
Command: necessary(student(X)). 
student(jane) is a necessary entry 
Command: retract (student (jane)) . 
The kinds of manipulations demonstrated here can be Command: necessary (student (X) ) . 
used to correct the notion of state enca.psulation and student(jane) is a necessary entry 
updating that was used in [15]. Command: necessary(student(bob)). 
Our second example of the of-course modality is a sim- again. 
ple natural language parsing example. In [23, 241 an quit 
intuitionistic context was used to manage the intro- 
duction and scoping of gaps. This approach, although 
modeling various aspects of gapping correctly, was un- Figure 8: A Session Using the Data Base Query Pro- 
satisfactory for at least two reasons. First, the phrase gra" 
"whom Bob married Ann" would parse incorrectly a.s 
a relative clause. The restriction that a gap, once in- 
troduced, must be used is not ea.sy to enforce using 
era1 similar types of "island constraints" occur in nat- 
sent(Pl,P2) o- bang(np(P1 ,PO)) x vp(PO,P2). ural language parsing problems [27]. The use of !'ed 
vp(Pi,P2) o- tv(P1,P0) x np(PO,P2). formulas may aid in handling these constraints as well. 
vp(P1 ,P2) o- stv(P1 ,PO) x sbar(PO,P2). 
sbar( [that IPl] ,P2) o- sent (PI ,P2). 
np(P1 ,P2) o- pn(P1 ,Pa) . 
rel([vhomlX],Y) o- all z\(np(z,z)) -0 sent(X,Y). 
pn(CmarylL1 ,L) 0- 1. 
pn([boblL],L) o- 1. 
pn(CannlL1,L) o- 1. 
tv([loveslLI ,L) o- 1. 
tv( CmarriedlLI ,L) o- 1. 
stv([believes 1 L] ,L) o- 1. 
Figure 9: A simple parser for gaps in English 
an intuitionistic context. Second, various restrictions 
on occurrences of gaps are not explained using such 
contexts. For example, gaps introduced by "whom" 
can occur in object but not nominal positions. Thus 
the phrase "whom Ann believes that Bob married" 
is correct (the gap is the object of "married") while 
"whom Ann believes that married Bob" is incorrect 
(the gap is the subject of "married"). This "modal" 
distinction between these two kinds of noun phrases is 
not addressed naturally using intuitionistic logic. 
The small logic program in Figure 9 illustrates how 
linear contexts can be used to solve these problems. 
Here, a definite clause grammar (DCG) [28] style 
presentation of a parser is used. Each category of 
the grammar, such as sent for sentence, vp for verb 
phrase, sbar for complement clauses, etc., is given 
two additional arguments, denoting a difference list, 
of words. The rule for relative clauses (rel) intro- 
duces a gap, namely the formula all z\(np(z,z)). 
This formula represents a contingent resource: a gap 
of zero length. I t  can be used to  prove the noun phra.se 
mentioned in the vp definite formula but not the one 
in the sent definite formula: tlie latter occurrence of 
np is protected by a !. Thus the two goals 
rel([whom,ann ,believes, that, bob,married] , [I ) 
re1 ( [whom, bob, married] . [I ) 
are provable but the two goals 
rel([whom,ann,believes, that ,married,bobl , [I ) 
re1 ( [whom, bob, married, ann] , [I ) 
6 Related Work 
There are many ways in which linear logic can be fruit- 
fully exploited to  address aspects of logic program- 
ming. Girard modeled the difference between the clas- 
sical, "external" logic of Horn clauses and the "inter- 
nal" logic of Prolog that arises from the use of depth- 
first search using a non-commutative linear logic [ll]. 
Cerrito appplied classical linear logic t o  the problem 
of formalizing finite failure for certain kinds of Horn 
clause programs where negations are permitted in the 
body of clauses [5]. 
Linear logic has been used to extend the basic de- 
sign of logic programming languages in at least two 
pa.pers other than this one. Andreoli and Pareschi ex- 
tended IIorn clauses so that programs in the resulting 
language make use of the multiple conclusion nature 
of full linea,r logic [Z]. In that extension, a form of 
context on the right of a sequent arrow is possible. 
They present several examples and argue that various 
aspects of object-oriented programming can be sup- 
ported naturally within such contexts. Interestingly, 
their extension is rather different than ours: the inter- 
section of the classes of program formulas in the two 
systems is just the set of Horn clauses. Harland and 
Pym a.lso proposed In a fragment of linear logic as a 
logic programming language [13]. As was done here, 
the fragment is chosen so that uniform proofs remain 
complete. Since having !'s in succedents stops several 
inference rule permutations from holding, their pro- 
posal disallows such succedents. Thus, goal formulas 
are weaker than those presented here, but contexts are 
richer. The loss of !'ed goals, however, means that the 
examples in Section 5 cannot be coded directly. 
In the area of natural language parsing, Lambek 
[16, 171 used a logic that can be identified with a non- 
commutative variant of linear logic for inferring the 
synta.ctic categories of phrases. Recently, Pereira han- 
dled gaps using a (commutative) linear logic-like con- 
text mechanism [26]. Neither of these approaches use 
Yi or the "of course" operator and, hence, the appar- 
ent modal distinction between noun phrase as subject 
or object cannot be captured directly in them. 
are not. As this parser rules out subject e ~ t r a . ~ t i o n ,  There ha.ve been several examples in print of the need 
sentences that require such extractions must be han- to refine the notion of intuitionistic context within 
dled with additional specialized grammer rules. Sev- logic programming. In this abstract, we proposed a 
refinement using a fragment of linear logic. We argued 
that this fragment is a sensible logic programming lan- 
guage and presented an interpreter for it. Finally, we 
outlined how those problems with intuitionistic con- 
texts can be addressed directly using the refillemeats 
available from linear logic. 
A prototype interpreter, written in SML, of the first- 
order logic programming language described here is 
available from the first author. 
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